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_____________ 
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Bruce P. Merenstein 
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP 
1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 
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Alex J. Zowin 
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Brian Paladino, an inmate at New Jersey State Prison 
(the “Prison”), filed a section 1983 civil rights action against 
various Prison employees alleging a number of constitutional 
claims.  The District Court granted summary judgment on 
many of his claims after finding that he failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (the “Act”).  In so doing, the District 
Court—without notifying the parties—relied on our decision 
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in Small v. Camden Cnty.1 to resolve the exhaustion issue 
based on the record alone. 
 
While we affirm with respect to the majority of 
Paladino’s claims, we vacate the grant of summary judgment 
on Paladino’s excessive force claim based on an alleged 
assault in October 2010 (the “2010 excessive force claim”) 
because there existed a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether he exhausted that claim.  Although 
conclusory assertions are insufficient to survive a motion for 
summary judgment, such relief should be denied when there 
is a genuine issue of material fact on exhaustion.   
 
As the District Court correctly noted, under Small, 
“judges may resolve factual disputes relevant to the 
exhaustion issue.”2  Nevertheless, as discussed below, we 
now hold that some type of notice and an opportunity to 
respond are needed before a district court elects to decide 
factual disputes regarding exhaustion.  Thus, we remand for 
further proceedings as to whether Paladino properly 
exhausted his 2010 excessive force claim. 
 
I.  Background 
 
A. The Prison’s Grievance Process 
 
Prison inmates submit grievances through the Inmate 
Remedy System Form (the “form”).  Generally, a form should 
be processed and returned within thirty days.  An inmate must 
                                              
1 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013). 
2 Id. at 271. 
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appeal within ten days if he is dissatisfied with the response.  
The Administrator renders decisions on appeal.  An inmate 
who receives a response to his appeal has exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
 
B. Paladino’s Complaint 
 
 Paladino, then pro se, filed an initial complaint in 
April 2012, and an amended complaint in June 2012 
(collectively, the “Complaint”).  The District Court sua 
sponte dismissed several of Paladino’s claims, none of which 
are at issue.  However, the District Court permitted Paladino 
to proceed with claims that Defendants violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights by (1) using excessive force against him 
on three occasions; (2) subjecting him to poor conditions of 
confinement by depriving him of meals, recreation, contact 
visitation, educational programs, hygiene supplies, and 
cleaning supplies; and (3) providing inadequate medical care.  
The District Court further allowed Paladino to pursue 
Fourteenth Amendment claims for deprivation of meals, as 
well as cleaning, writing, and hygiene supplies. 
 
C. First Summary Judgment Motion  
 
In January 2013, Defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment based on Paladino’s failure to exhaust.  In 
support, Defendants searched the Prison’s records and 
attached all forms filed by Paladino from May 2011 through 
June 2012.  Defendants maintained that this evidence showed 
that Paladino failed to exhaust because he did not file the 
required forms for many of his claims, and while he filed 
forms for some of his other claims, he did not appeal the 
Prison’s responses to those forms. 
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 Paladino responded by generally claiming that the 
record was “incomplete.”3  Paladino also said that he 
appealed when he received responses to the forms, however, 
the Prison never responded to those appeals.  Paladino further 
broadly alleged that Prison employees “intentionally lie, 
manipulate, improperly handle and falsify” forms.4  Paladino 
did not, however, claim that the record was missing grievance 
forms he had filed concerning any of the claims at issue in his 
Complaint. 
     
 In June 2013, the District Court granted Defendants’ 
motion in part, finding that Paladino failed to exhaust his 
excessive force and medical care claims, as well as the 
majority of his conditions of confinement and equal 
protection claims (the “June 2013 order”).  In this regard, the 
District Court found that the forms Defendants submitted 
were “a complete set” because Paladino did not assert that he 
filed any other forms.5  Accordingly, because there were no 
forms in the record for the excessive force and medical care 
claims, as well as certain of the conditions of confinement 
and equal protection claims, the District Court entered 
summary judgment on them. 
   
However, the District Court denied the motion with 
respect to the conditions of confinement claims regarding 
hygiene supplies and recreational privileges, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment claims for hygiene and writing 
supplies.  The District Court held there was a genuine issue of 
                                              
3 JA 432. 
4 JA 423. 
5 JA 42. 
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material fact regarding exhaustion of these claims because 
Paladino filed forms for them and asserted that the Prison 
failed to respond. 
 
Paladino moved for reconsideration.  The District 
Court granted the motion in part, finding that it erred in 
granting summary judgment on the 2010 excessive force 
claim because the record only contained forms from May 
2011 to June 2012. 
 
D. Second Summary Judgment Motion 
 
At the heart of this appeal is Defendants’ second 
summary judgment motion on exhaustion grounds.  This 
time, Defendants submitted all forms filed by Paladino found 
in the Prison’s records between August 2010 and May 2011.  
Defendants contended that Paladino failed to exhaust his 
2010 excessive force claim because the Prison’s records did 
not contain a form for the underlying assault.  Defendants 
further argued that Paladino failed to exhaust his Eighth 
Amendment conditions of confinement claims regarding 
hygiene supplies and recreational privileges, as well as his 
Fourteenth Amendment claim for lack of hygiene supplies, 
because he did not appeal the Prison’s responses on those 
claims. 
 
 In opposition, Paladino vaguely insisted that he filed 
“numerous” forms and “appealed numerous responses” that 
“vanished after being properly submitted and/or filed.”6  
Paladino further stated that “numerous [] grievances have 
                                              
6 JA 1047–1048. 
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gone missing in regards to [his] claims of excessive force.”7  
Importantly, this last assertion was supported by specific 
record evidence in the form of Paladino’s sworn deposition 
testimony that he “submitted no less than six [] forms about 
[excessive force] [and], about wanting to be placed in some 
type of protective custody.”8  Indeed, when pressed during his 
deposition whether he filed forms “specifically about this 
allegation of excessive force,” Paladino responded “I 
remember they were about that, yes.”9  
   
In March 2015, the District Court granted summary 
judgment on Paladino’s remaining claims (the “March 2015 
order”).  Despite acknowledging “a factual dispute between 
the parties regarding the exhaustion issue,” the District Court 
did so on the record alone.10  In so doing, the District Court 
noted that Paladino “point[ed] to no substantive proof to 
support [his] conclusion besides his own self-serving 
assertions.”11 
 
The District Court held that, while Paladino submitted 
forms regarding a lack of hygiene supplies and recreational 
privileges, he did not exhaust those claims because “he did 
not appeal the initial decisions made by the [Prison].”12  Thus, 
the District Court granted summary judgment on the Eighth 
                                              
7 JA 1185. 
8 JA 810. 
9 JA 810. 
10 JA 57. 
11 JA 58. 
12 JA 60. 
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Amendment conditions of confinement claims for inadequate 
hygiene supplies and lack of recreational privileges, as well 
as the Fourteenth Amendment claim for lack of hygiene 
supplies.13  The District Court also held that Paladino failed to 
exhaust his 2010 excessive force claim because, while he 
“filed numerous [forms] relating to a variety of issues,” there 
was “no evidence” that he filed a form “relating to his 
allegations of an assault in October 2010.”14  In reaching this 
conclusion, the District Court did not consider Paladino’s 
sworn deposition testimony that he filed at least six forms for 
that claim.  This appeal followed.15 
 
                                              
13 As noted, Paladino’s remaining claims also included a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim for a lack of writing supplies.  
The District Court found that Paladino exhausted this claim, 
but granted summary judgment to Defendants on that claim 
on other grounds.  Paladino does not appeal that decision. 
14 JA 59. 
15 Paladino’s notice of appeal only listed the March 2015 
order.  However, because he filed his notice of appeal pro se, 
we will construe it to include the June 2013 order.  See Gov’t 
of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 751 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“The duty to construe appeal notices liberally is 
heightened in cases involving pro se appellants.”).  
9 
 
II. Discussion16 
 
The Act’s exhaustion requirement states that “[n]o 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”17  This requirement 
“applies to a grievance procedure described in an inmate 
handbook but not formally adopted by a state administrative 
agency.”18  “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the 
defendant must plead and prove; it is not a pleading 
requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff.”19 
   
  A. The Summary Judgment Orders 
 
Paladino contends that the District Court erred in 
granting motions for summary judgment because there were 
disputed factual issues regarding exhaustion.  Defendants 
respond that summary judgment was warranted “[b]ecause 
Paladino failed to submit anything other than self-serving 
assertions” to counter the “voluminous” records they 
                                              
16 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary 
judgment.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).   
18 Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1348–49 (3d Cir. 
2002).   
19 Small, 728 F.3d at 268. 
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produced.20  We address the two summary judgment orders in 
turn. 
 
i. The June 2013 Order 
 
We start with the June 2013 order granting summary 
judgment on Paladino’s inadequate medical care claims—as 
well as the majority of his excessive force, conditions of 
confinement, and equal protection claims—for failure to 
exhaust.   As noted, Defendants went through the Prison’s 
records and provided all forms therein filed by Paladino 
between May 2011 and June 2012.  Defendants argued that 
because the records contained no forms for the above claims, 
Paladino failed to exhaust them. 
   
In response, Paladino failed to assert that he filed 
forms for the claims that Defendants sought to dismiss on 
exhaustion grounds.  Rather, Paladino vaguely claimed—
without providing any specifics—that the Prison’s records 
were “incomplete” and that Prison employees purposefully 
interfered with his forms.21  However, “conclusory, self-
serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment.”22  Instead, Paladino needed to “set forth 
specific facts that reveal a genuine issue of material fact” 
concerning the exhaustion of these claims.23  Because he did 
not do so, we affirm the June 2013 order. 
                                              
20 Appellees’ Br. at 13–14.   
21 JA 432. 
22 Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 
156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
23 Id. 
11 
 
 
ii. The March 2015 Order 
 
We begin our discussion of the March 2015 order with 
the grant of summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment 
conditions of confinement claims for inadequate hygiene 
supplies and lack of recreational privileges, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment claim for lack of hygiene supplies.  
For their second summary judgment motion, Defendants 
checked the Prison’s records and attached all forms submitted 
by Paladino between August 2010 and May 2011.  
Defendants observed that while Paladino filed forms 
regarding a lack of hygiene supplies and recreational 
privileges, the records established that Paladino did not 
appeal the Prison’s responses to those forms.  From this, 
Defendants argued that Paladino failed to exhaust those 
claims.  
  
In opposing this documentary evidence, Paladino 
vaguely insisted that he “appealed numerous responses” that 
“vanished after being properly submitted and/or filed.”24  
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, “conclusory, self-serving 
affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment.”25  As such, we affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on these claims as well. 
 
We now turn to the 2010 excessive force claim.  Based 
on its review of the summary judgment record, the District 
Court held that Paladino failed to exhaust his 2010 excessive 
                                              
24 JA 1047–1048. 
25 Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 161 (citation omitted). 
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force claim.  In so doing, the District Court found that, while 
Paladino filed forms for a number of issues, the records 
submitted by the Prison did not contain any forms relating to 
the alleged underlying assault. 
   
We disagree with the District Court’s assessment of 
the record evidence.  Paladino’s sworn deposition 
testimony—which the District Court did not consider—sets 
forth specific facts that contradict Defendants’ evidence and 
establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
Paladino exhausted his 2010 excessive force claim.  
Specifically, at his deposition, Paladino asserted that he 
“submitted no less than six [] forms about [excessive force] 
[and], about wanting to be placed in some type of protective 
custody.”26  What’s more, when asked during his deposition 
whether he submitted forms “specifically about this allegation 
of excessive force,” Paladino responded “I remember they 
were about that, yes.”27  
   
Defendants characterize Paladino’s testimony as a 
“self-serving” statement that cannot defeat summary 
judgment.28  In support, Defendants cite Kirleis v. Dickie, 
McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., the only case the District Court 
cited on this point.  However, Kirleis clearly held that self-
serving affidavits pointing to specific facts can create a 
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary 
judgment.29 
                                              
26 JA 810. 
27 JA 810. 
28 Appellees’ Br. at 13. 
29 Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 161–62. 
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If anything, Kirleis shows that the District Court erred 
in granting summary judgment on the 2010 excessive force 
claim.  In Kirleis, we analyzed whether the plaintiff had 
agreed to arbitrate claims against her employer law firm.30  
The law firm argued that its bylaws mandated arbitration and 
that the plaintiff’s “self-serving and conclusory” affidavit 
contending that she never received a copy of the bylaws was 
insufficient to defeat its motion to compel arbitration.31  We 
disagreed and held that the affidavit was not conclusory—but 
rather created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
existence of an arbitration agreement—because it “detail[ed] 
the specific circumstances that rendered the formation of an 
agreement to arbitrate impossible.”32 
   
Similarly here, Paladino’s sworn deposition testimony 
“set[s] forth specific facts that reveal a genuine issue of 
material fact” regarding whether he exhausted his 2010 
excessive force claim.33  Indeed, “a single, non-conclusory 
affidavit or witness’s testimony, when based on personal 
knowledge and directed at a material issue, is sufficient to 
                                              
30 Id. at 158.   
31 Id. at 161.  While Kirleis involved a motion to compel 
arbitration, the standard for whether there is a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding the existence of an arbitration 
agreement is the same standard for a summary judgment 
motion.  Id. at 159 n.3. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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defeat summary judgment.”34  This is true even where, as 
here, the information is self-serving.35 
 
Moreover, “[i]n considering a motion for summary 
judgment, a district court may not make credibility 
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence.”36  
Rather, “the non-moving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed 
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”37  
Here, while it is possible that Paladino misrepresented the 
facts when he testified that he filed forms regarding the 
alleged 2010 assault, it is equally possible that he did not.  
Indeed, it is not unheard of for a grievance form to be lost.38 
   
                                              
34 Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 320 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
35 See id. at 321 n.2 (noting that while “the testimony of a 
litigant will almost always be self serving . . . that has never 
meant that a litigant’s evidence must be categorically rejected 
by the fact finder”). 
36 Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 
2004); see also Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 
57 F.3d 300, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Summary judgment is 
inappropriate when a case will turn on credibility 
determinations.”).  
37 Marino, 358 F.3d at 247 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). 
38 See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(addressing whether a prisoner exhausted his administrative 
remedies where a grievance was lost). 
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Altogether, given the conflict between the Prison’s 
records and Paladino’s deposition testimony, which created a 
genuine issue of material fact, the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment on the 2010 excessive force 
claim.  As such, we vacate this part of the March 2015 order. 
 
B. Application of Small 
 
 While summary judgment was improper on the 2010 
excessive force claim, the questions remains whether, as 
Paladino maintains, an evidentiary hearing was needed to 
resolve the factual dispute regarding whether Paladino 
exhausted that claim.   
 
The District Court relied on Small “to resolve the [] 
factual disputes between [Paladino] and Defendants regarding 
whether [Paladino] properly exhausted” based on the paper 
record alone.39  In Small, a state prisoner filed a civil rights 
action against a correctional facility and prison officers.40  
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment arguing that the plaintiff failed to exhaust.41  The 
District Court denied the motion and held a two-day 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of exhaustion.42  On appeal, 
we held that “the District Court did not err by acting as the 
fact finder because exhaustion constitutes a preliminary issue 
for which no right to a jury trial exists.”43 
                                              
39 JA 58. 
40 Small, 728 F.3d at 267. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 267–68. 
43 Id. at 271. 
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Small clearly held that “judges may resolve factual 
disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without the 
participation of a jury.”44  However, while Small extolled the 
“two-day, painstakingly thorough” evidentiary hearing in that 
case, it left open the question of what baseline procedures are 
required when a district court undertakes to serve as the fact 
finder on the exhaustion issue.45  From this, some district 
courts have interpreted Small as requiring an evidentiary 
hearing when exhaustion is in dispute, however, other district 
courts have resolved such disputes on the record alone.46 
 
 Against this context, we hold that some form of notice 
to the parties and an opportunity to respond are needed before 
a district court elects to resolve factual disputes regarding 
exhaustion under Small.  While we leave the exact form of 
the notice and opportunity to respond required to the 
discretion of the district courts on a case-by-case basis, we 
emphasize two items.  First, as to the notice required, a 
district court must—at a minimum—notify the parties that it 
                                              
44 Id.    
45 Id.    
46 Compare Romero v. Ahsan, No. 13-cv-7695, 2016 WL 
7424486, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2016) (finding that an 
evidentiary hearing was needed “to resolve the factual 
disputes regarding Plaintiff’s exhaustion of his administrative 
remedies”), with Werner v. Sorbin, No. 16-cv-1863, 2017 WL 
3582382, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2017) (holding that while 
the exhaustion issue “normally entails an evidentiary hearing 
before the judge,” disputed issues of fact could be resolved on 
the record). 
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will consider exhaustion in its role as a fact finder under 
Small before doing so.  Second, with regard to the 
opportunity to respond, a full-scale evidentiary hearing (i.e. 
involving live testimony) is not required each time that a 
prisoner claims that he exhausted his administrative remedies.  
Surely some cases will need a full-scale hearing, however, we 
leave that to the discretion of the district courts.  
Nevertheless, before proceeding under Small, a district court 
must at least provide the parties with an opportunity to submit 
materials relevant to exhaustion that are not already before it. 
   
 Applying these principles to the present dispute, we 
conclude that the District Court erred by not providing notice 
and an opportunity to respond once it decided to weigh 
exhaustion under Small.  
  
 In so holding, we note that the main remaining factual 
issue is the discrepancy between the Prison’s records and 
Paladino’s sworn deposition testimony that he submitted at 
least six forms for his 2010 excessive force claim.  
Defendants argue that Paladino’s testimony should be 
disbelieved because, while the Prison’s records showed that 
he filed forms during the relevant period, there was no record 
that he submitted a form regarding the alleged underlying 
assault.  In essence, Defendants maintain that, because the 
Prison’s records contain other forms submitted by Paladino, 
the absence of any form for the 2010 excessive force claim is 
dispositive of the exhaustion issue and Paladino’s testimony 
should be disbelieved.  However, the success of this argument 
depends on the reliability of the Prison’s recordkeeping 
18 
 
system.47  Here, the record is bereft of evidence that the 
Prison’s recordkeeping system is reliable.  Without such 
evidence, we cannot determine if Defendants have met their 
burden to prove that Paladino “failed to exhaust each of his 
claims.”48  Thus, if Defendants are unable to provide evidence 
showing the reliability of the Prison’s recordkeeping on 
remand, then an evidentiary hearing may be warranted to 
resolve whether Paladino exhausted his administrative 
remedies on his 2010 excessive force claim.49 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the June 2013 order, affirm in 
part and vacate in part the March 2015 order, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
47 We note, without passing judgment, that the Prison 
employs a paper-based record system, as opposed to an 
electronic system, for forms filed by inmates.  Cf. Dawson v. 
Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 719 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that, 
despite deposition testimony to the contrary, there was “no 
basis . . . to conclude that Plaintiff submitted a grievance that 
was not recorded” because there was “no electronic record of 
the grievance” in the Philadelphia Prison System’s electronic 
system).   
48 Small, 728 F.3d at 269 (emphasis in original). 
49 Paladino is correct that an inmate, who did not receive a 
response to a grievance he submitted, may not have had the 
Prison’s grievance process available to him, and is therefore 
excused from the exhaustion requirement.  However, we 
cannot determine whether the grievance process was available 
to Paladino based on the current record.   
